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We discuss a stochastic model to assess cumulative excess deaths during Covid-19-like epidemics
for various non-pharmaceutic interventions. The model simulates three interrelated stochastic pro-
cesses: epidemic spreading, availability of respiratory ventilators and changes in death statistics.
Epidemic may spread either locally or globally. The local mode simulates virus transmission through
contacts in the vicinity of the place of residence while the global mode simulates virus transmission
through social mixing in public places, sport arenas, airports, etc, where many people meet, who
live in remote geographic locations. Epidemic is modelled as a discrete time stochastic process on
random geometric networks. In the simulations we assume that the basic reproduction number is
R0 = 2.5 and the infectious period lasts ca. ten days. We also assume that the virus leads to severe
acute respiratory syndrome in about one percent of cases, which in turn almost surely lead to res-
piratory default and death, unless the patient receives an appropriate medical treatment supported
by respiratory ventilation. For other parameters, like mortality rate or the number of respiratory
ventilators per million of inhabitants, we take values typical for developed countries. We simulate
populations of 105 − 106 people. We compare different strategies: do-nothing, social distancing, re-
duction of social mixing and lockdown, assuming that there is no vaccine and no efficient medicine.
The results of the simulations show that strategies that slow down the spread of epidemic too much
are inefficient in reducing the cumulative excess of deaths. A hybrid strategy in which lockdown is
in place for some time and is then completely released is inefficient as well.
∗ zdzislaw.burda@agh.edu.pl
2I. INTRODUCTION
Mathematical and computer modelling have proved to be very useful tools for controlling existing infectious diseases
[1–4] as well as for analysing and forecasting epidemics [5–7]. Modelling of infectious diseases and epidemics has a
long history [8–11]. The foundations of the contemporary theoretical epidemiology were laid by W.O. Kermack and
A.G. McKendrick [12]. Today, theoretical epidemiology is a matured field of research [1–4].
In the last decades the classical epidemic models have been reformulated in the framework of complex networks
science [13]. Complex networks [14–17] are very well suited to encode heterogeneity of spatial distribution [18]
and mobility of population [19–21]. New techniques, which go beyond the classical mean-field approach, have been
developed and successfully applied to modelling of epidemic spreading in heterogeneous systems. Among these new
techniques it is worth mentioning degree-based mean-field theory [22, 23], spatial and mobility networks [19–21]
and meta-population approach [24] were one can superimpose hierarchical transportation network on the population
distribution in communities, cities, regions and countries, to differentiate between disease transmission modes in the
regional and global scales. The models became very realistic. They can be fed with real-world data and used to
forecast real world epidemics [6, 7, 20, 25–30].
In this article, we are developing a model for Covid-19-like epidemics that lead in about one percent of cases to
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), causing respiratory failure and death [31]. In order to make the model
fully realistic for a specific epidemic, say Covid-19, it would require taking into account all medical, demographic,
social, economic, geographic and any many other factors with thousands of parameters. These factors are still under
active investigation and need to be determined. That is why in this paper we talk about a class of similar epidemics
rather than a specific one. We focus on key factors that are important to assess the impact of various epidemic
containment measures on reducing excess deaths. They are the following:
• In the absence of a vaccine immunity can only be obtained through infection;
• People who get infected become infectious for some time;
• People who recover are immune to reinfection;
• About one percent of all infections lead to SARS;
• SARS occurrence is correlated with health conditions and the age of the infected person;
• SARS leads almost surely to respiratory failure and death unless the person receives an appropriate medical
assistance supported by artificial ventilation;
• Respiratory ventilation decreases the death probability; The death probability is correlated with general health
conditions of the patient;
• The health care system has a limited capacity - in particular, the number of intensive care beds and mechanical
ventilators is limited;
• The mortality rate of other causes like cancer, cardiovascular diseases, diabetes and other chronic diseases
increases during epidemic because of epidemic restrictions on medical procedures;
The model simulates the spread of epidemics, the availability of respiratory ventilators for patients with SARS during
epidemic, as well as a stochastic process that shapes population reference statistics. These three interrelated stochastic
processes are important for assessing the number of excess deaths during Covid-19-like epidemics and for selecting
the optimal strategy to reduce deaths.
II. RESULTS
A. Modes of infection transmission
Epidemic spreading is simulated on geometric random networks [32, 33], see Section IVA for details. There are
two different disease transmission modes: a local and a global one. Local transmission corresponds to geographic
epidemic spreading through human-to-human contacts near the place of residence. This is modelled as transmissions
between neighbouring vertices of the network. The global mode corresponds to the disease transmission through
contacts at places, like hospitals, cinemas, sport arenas, schools, universities, churches, airports, communications
means, workplaces and many others, where people, who live in different geographic locations, meet. This effect is
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FIG. 1. (Left) Phase portraits of a simulated epidemic, with different values of the long-range social mixing parameter α, on
random geometric random network. The simulations are carried out on networks with N = 105 nodes and the mean node
degree 〈k〉 = 100. The basic reproduction number used in the simulations is R0 = 2.5, the infectious period duration is τ = 10
and the mixing parameter is α = 1.0, 0.1, 0.01, 0.002, 0.0 (from top to bottom). The results for α = 1.0 are shown in symbols
and they are compared to a theoretical mean-field result (8) (solid line) going through the symbols. The value of the basic
reproduction number in the mean-field result is R0 = 2.53. (Right) Two different simulations for α = 1.0 (symbols) compared
to the mean-field result (solid line), and three different simulations for α = 0.0.
implemented in the model as transmissions between randomly selected nodes, independently of their positions on the
network. We shall call this effect long-range social mixing. Long-range social mixing leads to outbreaks in remote
locations and it accelerates epidemic spreading.
In the model there is a control parameter α which interpolates between these two modes of transmission. The
epidemic spreads by long range social mixing with a probability α or it spreads locally with a probability 1− α. For
α = 1 the epidemic is described by the classical SIR mean-field dynamics [3, 12] which depends only on the node
degree distribution, while for α = 0 - by a quasi-diffusive dynamics reflecting the geographic population distribution.
In Fig. 1 we show phase portraits for epidemics with different values of α on random geometric networks with N = 105
nodes. See Section IVB for details. As one can see from Fig. 1 the results of simulations for α = 1.0 are very well
described the by the phase-portrait (8) of the classical SIR compartmental model [3, 12]. The number of infective
agents is maximal at Smax/N ≈ 1/R0 ≈ 0.4 and the herd immunity is achieved for Shi/N ≈ 0.1− 0.11, which is seen
in the chart as the place were the curve hits zero. This value is close to the mean-field prediction (8). The value of
the basic reproduction number, R0 = 2.53, of the best fit to the theoretical curve given by the mean-field solution (8)
differs by one percent from the value R0 = 2.5 used in the Monte-Carlo simulations. The difference can be attributed
to the fact that the classical mean-field dynamics is deterministic [3, 12] and R0 is a number, while in the simulations
the dynamics is stochastic and R0 is the mean value of a random variable. The variance of this random variable
introduces some corrections to the effective value of R0.
The phase portrait starts to deviate from the mean-field solution when α decreases (see Fig. 1) that is when long-
range social mixing gets smaller. As shown in the right panel in Fig. 1 the phase portraits for different simulations
for α = 1 lie on top of each other and are consistent with the classical SIR solution. For α = 0 the curves differ from
each other and change in a stochastic way.
The herd immunity value Shi weakly depends on α (see Fig.1). The values of Shi/N ≈ 0.10 − 0.11 are almost
identical for α = 1, and α = 0. What depends on α is the height of the curve which is a few times larger for α = 1
than for α = 0. This means that long-range social mixing significantly speeds up epidemic spreading. The effect is
illustrated in Fig. 2 where we compare dynamics of the epidemics for four different scenarios which differ by the basic
reproduction number R0 and the long-range social mixing parameter α. One can see that the spread of epidemic
depends on the basic reproduction number R0 as well as the long range social mixing parameter α. The parameter
α can be reduced by closing airports, schooles, churches, sport arenas, etc. The reproduction number can be lowered
to a value R′
0
< R0 through social distancing that is maintaining physical distance between people, reducing the
frequency of personal contacts, wearing masks as well as disinfection, quarantine, isolation, etc.
In the next section we shall assess effects of these actions on the total mortality during epidemic using Monte-Carlo
simulations of Covid-19-like epidemics.
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FIG. 2. The charts show the dynamics of epidemic for four scenario: (1) R0 = 2.5, α = 1.0; (2) R0 = 2.5, α = 0.0; (3) R0 = 1.5,
α = 1.0; (4) R0 = 1.5, α = 0.0. We use an agent-based implementation of SIR dynamics on geometric random networks
described in Section IVB. The population size is N = 105, the mean node degree is 〈k〉 = 100, the expected duration of the
infectious period is τ = 10 in all four cases presented in the figures. (Left) The number of infectious agents I(t) as a function of
time t expressed in days from the beginning of the epidemic. (Right) The number of immune agents: I(t) +R(t) = N − S(t),
where I(t), R(t) and S(t) are the numbers of infectious, recovered and susceptible agents, respectively. For scenario 1, the herd
immunity level 90% is reached in t = 199 days. In scenarios 2,3,4, the herd immunity levels: 89%, 59%, 50% are reached in:
t = 398, 444, 1678 days, respectively.
B. Assessing mortality rate for different scenarios
We make the following assumptions in the model to incorporate these factors:
• We assume that in the the studied period there is no vaccine and no medicine available so one can only apply
non-pharmaceutic interventions to mitigate epidemic spreading. To be specific let us assume that this period
is 1000 days. The non-pharmaceutic interventions are divided into two classes: social distancing and reducing
long-range social mixing. The first strategy is implemented in the model by reducing the reproduction number
R0 to some effective value R
′
0 which is smaller than the basic reproduction number R
′
0 < R0, while the second
one - by lowering the value of the long-range social mixing parameter α;
• The basic reproduction number is R0 = 2.5. The mean infectious period is τ = 10 days.
• The correlations between the occurrence of SARS and health conditions are modelled by dividing the population
into a class of healthy people and a class of people who have some health issues, chronic diseases, or other
problems requiring treatment and regular contacts with a doctor. The two classes are labeled in the model by
H and C, respectively. We assume that the percentage of people in the H class is pH = 75% and in the C class
pC = 25%. We assume also that SARS occurs with a probability pH,sars = 1/300 in the H class and with a
probability pC,sars = 3/100 in the C class. This gives one percent on average for the whole population.
• The probability of dying of SARS is about 90% in the H compartment and 100% in the C compartment. The
probability drops to about 10% in the H class and to 30% in the C class, if the person receives intensive medical
care supported by mechanical ventilation.
• The number of available mechanical ventilators is 270 per million inhabitants. This sets the upper limit on the
number of people who can be simultaneously ventilated;
• The mortality rate of other diseases than those caused by the virus is 27 per million per day and it increases to
30 per million per day during the epidemic. In other words, the background mortality increases by about 10%
during the epidemic.
The model is implemented by superimposing SIR dynamics on a background stochastic dynamics, see Section IVB.
The background dynamics models the basic health and mortality statistics in the population. In our model it is
implemented as a Markov chain which preserves the total size of the population by replacing deaths by newborns.
The stationary state of the Markov chain reproduces the statistics of the H and C classes and the mortality rate of
causes not related to the virus, see Section IVC for details. The health care system capacity is modelled by a single
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FIG. 3. The cumulative number of excess deaths for different scenarios in Monte-Carlo simulations of epidemic for population
of N = 105 agents on random geometric network. The number is calculated as a difference between the cumulative number
of deaths and 2.7t, where 2.7 corresponds to daily mortality rate in the population of hundred thousand people if there is no
epidemic. (Left) The top curve corresponds to the worst case scenario, that is none of SARS patients receives medical assistance
during the epidemic. The four curves below correspond to the scenarios 1-4 given in the main text. They also correspond
to the four scenarios shown in Fig. 2. The curve in the bottom is an example of the background mortality data generated
by Monte-Carlo in the absence of epidemic. In this case the number of excess deaths fluctuates around zero. (Right) The
cumulative number of excess deaths for scenarios 1,5,6. One can see that the strategy of maintaining lockdown for some time
and then replacing it by the do-nothing strategy, does not significantly reduce the total number of deaths as compared to the
situation when the do-nothing strategy is introduced at the beginning of the epidemic.
number, which accounts for the number of available respiratory ventilators. The ventilators are used to ventilate SARS
patients. The problem occurs when the number of SARS cases exceeds the number of available ventilators, because
some people will not receive a required treatment and thus will have a lesser chance to stay alive. A ventilator is
occupied by the SARS patient until he or she recovers or dies and only then it can be used for another SARS patient.
It may take ten days on average, so the number of occupied ventilators saturates quickly if there are more than 27
new SARS cases per million inhabitants per day.
We are now going to compare the total death toll of the simulated epidemic for six scenarios:
1. R′0 = R0 = 2.5 and α = 1.0. This simulates do-nothing scenario. Epidemic spreads without any restrictions.
2. R′0 = R0 = 2.5 and α = 0.0. This simulates a suppression of virus transmission through reducing long-range
social mixing.
3. R′
0
= 1.5 < R0 and α = 1.0. This simulates social distancing and lowering the transmission rate.
4. R′
0
= 1.5 < R0 and α = 0.0. This simulates lockdown. Both, the local and global transmission modes are
restricted.
5. Lockdown for 300 days, as in item 4, and then do-nothing scenario, as in item 1.
6. Lockdown for 600 days, as in item 4, and then do-nothing scenario, as in item 1.
Fig. 3 shows results of Monte-Carlo simulations of the accumulated excess death toll in the epidemic as a function
of time for a population of 105 people for 1000 days, for the six different scenarios. The first four scenarios are
shown in the left panel in Fig. 3 and the remaining two in the right panel. In the left panel we additionally draw
two reference curves representing the worse case scenario when no SARS patients receive required medical assistance
during epidemic, and the best case when there is no epidemic. The charts in the right figure show what happens when
lockdown is introduced right at the beginning of the epidemic, maintained for 300 or 600 days, and lifted afterwards.
As a reference we also show the curve for scenario 1 which is identical as in the left figure.
Comparing the scenarios we see that after 200 days there are 703 excess deaths in scenario 1, 249 in scenario 2, 275
in scenario 3 and 70 in scenario 4, so the lockdown strategy might seem to be optimal. However when one checks the
total number of surplus deaths after 1000 days, which is 709, 467, 431 and 397 in scenarios 1-4, respectively, one can
see that lockdown is much less advantageous than strategies 2,3. The total death toll for scenario 4 is comparable as
for scenarios 2,3 but in this case the epidemic is not yet dying out in contrast to the cases 2,3 where the epidemic is
over (compare Fig. 2). For scenario 4 the accumulated excess deaths curve is still rising after 1000 days. One can
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FIG. 4. (Left) The number of SARS patients and the number of occupied intensive care beds equipped with ventilators. In
the simulations presented in the figure, the number of ventilators is limited to 27. The difference between the two curves
corresponds to the number of patients who will not receive adequate medical assistance. The figure shows results of Monte-
Carlo simulations for scenarios 1,2,4. (Right) The number of deaths per day in scenario 1 and 2. For scenario 1 one can see
a clear peak during the fast spread of epidemic. For scenario 2 one can also see a peak but it is wider and lower, and it only
slightly exceeds fluctuations of the background mortality. We do not plot curves for other scenarios because the figures would
be less transparent.
also see that maintaining lockdown for some time and then completely lifting it as in scenario 5 or 6 does not help
in reducing the excess mortality as compared to the do-nothing scenario. The best results are achieved by slowing
down the epidemic to some extent as in scenarios 2,3. These two strategies save lives of 0.5% of the whole population,
that is about five thousand people per million. In Fig. 4 we show the number of SARS patients and the number of
ventilated SARS patients during epidemic for various scenarios. The difference between the two curves corresponds to
the number of SARS patients who do not receive required medical assistance. In the right panel we show the number
of deaths per day. The number is a sum of deaths of SARS and of other causes. The former is roughly proportional to
the difference between the number of all SARS patients and ventilated SARS patients while the latter is proportional
to the mortality rate of other causes which is by ten percent higher during the simulated epidemic, see Section IVC
for details.
So far we have presented results of simulations for N = 105. We end this section by noting that one obtains
qualitatively the same results for larger populations. As an example we compare simulations for N = 105 and
N = 106 on geometric random networks with the mean degree 〈k〉 = 100. The initial condition for SIR dynamics
is I0 = 5 infectious agents placed on randomly selected vertices of the network of size N = 10
5. All others agents
(vertices) are initially susceptible. The corresponding initial condition is I0 = 50 for N = 10
6. Also other parameters
are correspondingly rescaled, for example the number of available respiratory ventilators is ten times larger, the
expected number of deaths per day is ten times larger etc, to keep these numbers proportional to the population size.
The results of the comparison are shown in Fig. 5. In the left panel we compare SIR dynamics. The figure shows
the fraction of infected people as a function of time. We see that the curves obtained in Monte-Carlo simulations for
α = 1 are almost identical for N = 105 and N = 106, as expected. This is the mean-field regime. For α = 0 epidemic
spreading depends on geometric details of the network. Epidemic spreading has a quasi-diffusive character in this
case. For the initial conditions that we described, the average distance between locations where epidemic initially
outbreaks is the same in the two cases, so one can expect that also the duration of epidemic is comparable. And
indeed, this is what one can see in Fig. 5 on the left hand side. The right panel shows the number of all SARS
patients and of ventilated ones, for N = 106. The curves display a similar pattern as the one for N = 105 shown in
Fig. 4, except that the statistical fluctuations are now smaller due to the law of large numbers.
III. DISCUSSION
We have conducted a Monte-Carlo study of epidemic spreading on random geometric networks to assess efficiency
of non-pharmaceutic interventions in reducing the total number of surplus deaths during Covid-19-like epidemics. We
have discussed strategies based on social distancing and restricting long-range social mixing. They have different effects
on epidemic spreading. Social distancing reduces the basic reproduction number R0 to some effective reproduction
number R′
0
< R0. Restrictions on long-range social mixing reduce virus transmission between remote places. When
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FIG. 5. (Left) Comparison of infectious fractions in the Monte-Carlo simulations of SIR dynamics for α = 1 and α = 0 on
geometric random networks with N = 105 and N = 106 nodes. Initially there are I0 = 5 infected nodes on random locations
of the network with N = 105 nodes and I0 = 50 infected nodes on random locations of the network with N = 10
6 nodes. The
results for α = 1 are almost identical for N = 105 and N = 106, so the two curves overlap. (Right) The number of SARS cases
and the number of SARS ventilated cases for N = 106. Compare with the left panel in Fig. 4.
long range mixing is large, the epidemic spreads via mean-field dynamics, when it is small it spreads via quasi-
diffusive dynamics depending on the geographic population distribution. We have studied the two modes of disease
transmission.
There are two sources of deaths which contribute to the total death toll during a Covid-19-like epidemic. One is
related to SARS, caused by the virus, and the other one to other diseases. The number of SARS deaths depends on
the number of respiratory ventilators. If the daily number of new SARS cases exceeds V/τ where V is the number of
ventilators and τ is the number of days of using one ventilator for one SARS patient, some people with SARS will
not be ventilated and will have less chance to survive. If one assumes that there are 270 ventilators per million, and
τ = 10, then V/τ = 27. As long as the number of SARS patients is below 27 per million then the number of deaths
caused by SARS is minimal. This effect can be achieved by slowing down epidemic. On the other hand the number
of excess deaths of other causes will increase proportionally to the epidemic duration so it is not beneficial to slow
it down too much. The optimal solution is to keep the number of SARS cases close to the capacity of the health
care system, but not much below it. In regions, where the number of available ventilators is very small and V/τ is
comparable to the excess mortality of other diseases the best solution is to do nothing. For example, in one assumes
that there are 3 excess deaths of other causes during epidemic per day per million and there are less then V = 30
ventilators per million then the do-nothing approach is optimal. For the same reason it is not very beneficial to slow
down the epidemic to the extent that there are only a few SARS cases per day. In this case the epidemic will last a
long time and there will be many surplus deaths of other causes. We have also shown that a strategy of maintaining
lockdown for some time and then releasing it by removing all restrictions has a similar effect on the number of deaths
as if one introduced the do-nothing strategy right at the beginning. The deaths differ only by the time when they
occur: in the do-nothing scenario the mortality is large at the beginning of the epidemic while in the other case it is
large when the lockdown is released. A strict lockdown makes sense only if one expects that an effective medicine or
a vaccine are going to be approved in a short time, or if one needs some time to increase the capacity of the health
care system by buying new respiratory ventilators and training people, etc. Otherwise, the optimal strategy is to keep
the epidemic progress at the level that the number of SARS patients at any time is roughly equal to the number of
respiratory ventilators. If the number of SARS cases is much larger than that, too many people will die of SARS; if
it is much smaller than that, the epidemic will last too long and as a result too many people will die of other causes.
For the simulated epidemic the strategies based on either social distancing or reducing long range social mixing
(scenarios 2,3) give results close to the optimal one. Indeed, as one can see in Fig. 4 the number of SARS deaths
in the peak of epidemic in scenario 2 does not significantly exceed the background mortality. In reality, however, it
is much more difficult to tune parameters that control the spread of the epidemic and to find a way to implement
appropriate actions in society.
Social distancing reduces the effective reproduction number to a value R′
0
< R0 below the basic reproduction
number. The herd immunity level for R′0 is smaller than the herd immunity level fo R0. This means that after lifting
restrictions on social distance and restoring normal contacts between people, the percentage of immune people will be
below the herd immunity level. The system will be unstable, in the sense that a new single infective person may trigger
a new outbreak of epidemic. The situation is similar to superheated liquid, where boiling may occur spontaneously
8at any time. For example, the total number of deaths in the simulated epidemic is comparable for scenarios 2 and 3
(see Fig. 3), but the percentage of immune people at the end of epidemic is 89% in scenario 2 and 50% in scenario 3,
as one can see in Fig. 2. The value 89% is close to the herd immunity level for R0 = 2.5 while 50% is far below it.
This means that the epidemic in scenario 3 can restart from the level 50% when the restrictions are lifted and a new
infective person appears. This example shows that strategies reducing long range social mixing bring better effects
than social distancing. They are however much more difficult to implement.
The model that we described in this paper can be developed in many directions. One can introduce a full MSEIR
dynamics, one can expand the background dynamics by implementing age groups, each having own distribution of
health conditions and death statistics, one can introduce social mixing matrices for different public places where long
range social mixing takes place, one can use the meta-population approach to model in detail the long range social
mixing mechanisms and one can also introduce some temporal aspects.
IV. METHODS
A. Random geometric networks
Random geometric networks are constructed by the proximity rule [32, 33]. Two nodes are connected by an
edge if they lie within the given distance from each other. The simplest example is a network constructed by
connecting randomly distributed points in a d-dimensional Euclidean space. One can apply this construction to
imitate a geographical proximity network in two-dimensions to model a network of contacts between people. For
sake of simplicity we assume that the points are uniformly distributed on a two-dimensional square with the periodic
boundary conditions. This can be done by generating pairs of coordinates (xi, yi) i = 1, . . . , N consisting of 2N
independent random numbers uniformly distributed on the unit interval [0, 1] and connecting any two points i and j
by an edge of the network if the distance between them is smaller than ǫ: ∆x2ij+∆y
2
ij ≤ ǫ
2. For the periodic boundary
conditions the coordinate differences are calculated as follows ∆xij = min (|xj − xi|, 1− |xj − xi|) and analogously
for ∆yij . The node degree distribution of the network obtained in this way follows the binomial law
P (k) =
(
N − 1
k
)
ak(1 − a)N−1−k, (1)
where a = πǫ2 is the area of a circle of radius ǫ. The mean degree distribution is 〈k〉 = (N − 1)a, and the variance
σ2(k) = (N − 1)a(1 − a). When a is of order 1/N the distribution becomes Poissonian in the large N limit. The
average clustering coefficient of the network is large 〈C〉 = 1 − 3
√
3
4pi ≈ 0.586503. [32]. This means that neighbours of
a node are directly connected with a very high probability. This feature of geometric random networks constitutes
the main difference to Erdőes-Rényi random graphs [34], for which the clustering coefficient is of order 1/N . This has
also consequences for epidemic spreading on such networks.
B. Agent-based implementation of SIR dynamics
We use a discrete time stochastic implementation of the standard SIR dynamics [3, 12]. The network is populated
with agents residing on its nodes. The population is divided into three classes: susceptible (S), infectious (I) and
recovered (R) which describe the state of each agent at time t. The states change in the course of evolution according
to epidemic rules which are implemented in the model in the form of a discrete time stochastic process. Time is
counted in days from the outbreak of the epidemic. Initially, that is for time t = 0, one agent, or a few ones are
infectious, while all others are susceptible. An infectious agent remains infective for τ days on average, and then it
recovers. This is simulated in the model by assuming that the probability of remaining infective till next day is q and
of recovering is 1− q. The life time distribution of infectious state is given by the following exponential law
Pi(t) = (1− q)q
t−1, t = 1, 2, . . . (2)
The mean life time of infectious state is related to the probability q as follows
τ = 〈t〉 =
∞∑
t=1
tPi(t) =
1
1− q
(3)
which means that for
q =
τ − 1
τ
(4)
9the expected infectious period is τ days. Clearly, for τ ≫ 1 the probability distribution (2) can be approximated by
Pi(t) ≈ e
−t/τ/τ . Once an infective person recovers he or she remains recovered for the rest of the evolution. If a
susceptible agent has a contact with an infective one and this contact is sufficient for disease transmission the agent
becomes infective. In the model there are two different transmission modes: a local one – between neighbouring nodes
on the network, and a global one – between randomly selected nodes independently of their locations on the network.
The probability of the global transmission is α and of the local one 1−α. For α = 0 the spread of epidemic is entirely
shaped by local properties of the network while for α = 1 only on average properties of the whole network. The global
mode is well captured by the classical mean-field dynamics [3, 12].
Let p be a probability that the disease is transmitted from an infectious agent to a susceptible agent within one
day. The probability pt of a transmission within t days is pt = 1 − (1 − p)
t. The life time of an infectious state is a
random variable (2). The transmission probability for the whole life-time can be calculated as the expected value of
〈pt〉 = 1− 〈(1 − p)
t〉 for the random variable t (2). This yields
〈pt〉 =
τp
1 + p(τ − 1)
(5)
for q given by (4). An agent has on average 〈k〉 neighbours, so the number of infections generated by a single infective
in a fully susceptible population is
R0 = 〈k〉
τp
1 + p(τ − 1)
. (6)
This equation relates the basic reproduction number R0 to the parameters of the model.
The epidemic evolution is implemented in a synchronous way in the model which means that all states are updated
simultaneously. States at time t + 1 are computed from states at time t. The following rules are used to update the
states. If a node is recovered at time t it remains recovered at time t+ 1. If a node is infectious at time t it remains
infectious at time t+1 with a probability q. Otherwise, it changes to recovered. If a node is susceptible at t it changes
to infectious with a probability p∗. Otherwise it remains susceptible. The probability p∗ of becoming infectious is
related to the transmission probability p by the following relation p∗ = 1 − (1 − p)i∗ where i∗ is an effective number
of infectious neighbours
i∗ = (1− α)in + α
〈k〉I
N
. (7)
In the local transmission mode, that is for α = 0, the quantity i∗ is proportional to the number of direct infectious
neighbours in. In the global transmission mode, that is for α = 1, the quantity i∗ is proportional to all infectious
nodes on the network 〈k〉I/N . When α changes from zero to one, i∗ interpolates between the two limiting cases.
In the classic approach one usually uses the continuous time formalism [3, 12]. The epidemic evolution is described
by a set of first order ordinary differential rate equations for the fractions of susceptible, infectious and recovered
agents: s(t) = S(t)/N , i(t) = I(t)/N , r(t) = R(t)/N . The epidemic outbreaks if s(0)R0 > 1. The quantity
φ(t) = i(t) + s(t)−
1
R0
ln s(t) = const (8)
is conserved during the evolution [3, 12]. s(t) is a non-increasing function of time t and r(t) is a non-decreasing function.
The infectious fraction, i(t) increases for t < tmax and reaches a maximum for t = tmax such that R0s(tmax) = 1.
Indeed, as one can see from eq. (8), the derivative di/ds = −1+ 1R0s changes sign when this condition is fulfilled. For
t > tmax the epidemic begins to die out and i(t) decreases from the maximum to zero: i(t) → 0 when t → ∞. The
fraction of susceptible population for t→∞ gives the level of herd immunity s(t)→ shi. The value shi can be found
from Eq. (8). In particular, if i(0) is very close to zero and s(0) = 1 − i(0), then shi is a solution to the equation
ln shi = R0(shi − 1). This yields shi ≈ 0.4172, 0.2032, 0.1074, 0.0595 for R0 = 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, respectively, to give
some examples.
We use the following input parameters in the Monte-Carlo simulations of the epidemic on geometric random
networks: the number of agents N , the mean node degree 〈k〉, the basic reproduction number R0, the expected
duration of the infectious period τ , the probability α of long range transmission. As an initial configuration we choose
a configuration which consists of I0 randomly selected infectious nodes. The remaining nodes are susceptible. The
probability to remain infectious till the next day is calculated from Eq. (4). The probability of virus transmission
from an infectious agent to a susceptible one within one day is calculated from Eq. (6) which gives
p =
1
τ
(
〈k〉
R0
− 1
)
+ 1
. (9)
An example of input values used in the simulations is N = 105, 〈k〉 = 100, R0 = 2.5, τ = 10, α = 0, I0 = 5.
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C. Modelling background conditions
In order to asses the impact of epidemics on death statistics one has also to determine the death statistics and the
background conditions in the absence of epidemic. This is per se an interesting and very complex problem since it
involves demographic factors, efficiency of health care systems, statistics of diseases, and many other factors. This
is beyond the scope of this paper. Here we restrict ourselves to model only primary factors which may help to
understand how the death statistics changes during epidemic. In the model this is implemented as follows. The
population is divided into classes according to health conditions. In the simplest version of the model we introduce
only two classes which correspond to healthy people and people with chronic diseases. We label the classes by H and
C, respectively. The division is symbolic, but it allows including in the model statistical correlations between health
conditions and mortality. The mortality rate in the C class is significantly higher than in the H class. The second
important difference is that the death probability during epidemics increases faster in the C class than in the H class.
The details are given in the next section.
We assume that the size of population is constant during the epidemic. The number of deaths is compensated by
the number of newborns. Denote the fraction of healthy people at time t by h(t) = H(t)/N , the fraction of chronically
ill people by c(t) = C(t)/N and the fraction of deaths by d(t) = D(t)/N . We have h(t) + c(t) + d(t) = 1.
We implement the population dynamics as a discrete time stochastic process (Markov chain) with the following
evolution equation
(h(t+ 1), c(t+ 1), d(t+ 1)) = (h(t), c(t), d(t))

 pHH pHC pHDPCH pCC pCD
pDH pDC pDD

 . (10)
The matrix in this equation is a stochastic matrix. It describes the transition probabilities between the states H,C,D.
The transition rates pDH and pDC add up to one pDH + pDC = 1, which means that the number of deaths is equal
to the number of newborns. The parameter pDH is the probability that newborns will be healthy at the beginning.
For sake of simplicity, but without loss of generality, we additionally assume pHD = pDC = pCH = 0. The condition
pHD = 0 means that the mortality rate of healthy people is zero or much smaller than the mortality rate of chronically
ill people. The condition pDC = 0 means that a death is replaced by a healthy newborn. The condition pCH = 0
means that a chronically ill person does not become healthy again. Under these assumptions the last equation can be
simplified to
(h(t+ 1), c(t+ 1), d(t+ 1)) = (h(t), c(t), d(t))

 1− β β 00 1− γ γ
1 0 0

 . (11)
The transfer matrix has only two free parameters: β – the rate of becoming chronically ill and γ – the rate of dying.
This stochastic process has a stationary state
h∗ =
γ
β + γ + βγ
,
c∗ =
β
β + γ + βγ
,
d∗ =
βγ
β + γ + βγ
.
(12)
We assume that d∗ = 27 · 10−6. The value d∗ is adjusted to a typical mortality rate in European countries which is
27 per million per day. In most of our simulations we have h∗ ≈ 0.75 and c∗ ≈ 0.25, which means that the simulated
population consists in 75% of healthy people and in 25% of people with chronic, cardiovascular, oncologic or other
serious diseases. The corresponding parameters of the transfer matrix (11), which reproduce the stationary state, are
β ≈ d∗/h∗ = 36 · 10−6 and γ ≈ d∗/(1− h∗) = 108 · 10−6.
We conclude this section with two remarks. We have assumed that there is no direct transfer from H to D, from D
to C and from C to H within one day, by setting pHD = 0, pDC = 0 and pCH = 0. One should note that the effective
transfers rates between these sectors are non-zero already for two days

 1− β β 00 1− γ γ
1 0 0


2
=

 (1 − β)
2 β(2 − β − γ) βγ
γ (1− γ)2 γ(1− γ)
1− β β 0

 . (13)
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The second remark is that the square or a higher power of the transfer matrix (11) is also a stochastic matrix. In
principle one can replace the original transfer matrix by any power of it, and interpret it as a daily transfer matrix.
This will not change the stationary state. The stationary state is a left eigenvector of the transfer matrix associated
with the eigenvalue 1 and it is identical for the transfer matrix (11) or any power of it. The transfer matrix (11) has
three eigenvalues. The one which has the largest absolute value is λ1 = 1 and the second largest is λ2 ≈ 1−β−γ. The
eigenvalue λ2 tells us about correlations of states at different times t, t
′. The correlation function decays exponentially
as exp(−|t − t′|/T ). The correlation time T can be derived from λ2: T ≈ −1/ log(λ2) ≈ 1/(β + γ). For the transfer
matrix (11) T is of order 104. By raising this matrix to the n-th power and interpreting the resultant matrix as a
daily transfers matrix one can reduce the autocorrelation time from T to T/n.
D. Simulating death statistics during epidemic
We assume that the infection leads to SARS with a probability pH,sars = 1/300 in the H compartment and with a
probability pC,sars = 3/100 in the C compartment. This yields on average
psars = h∗pH,sars + c∗pC,sars ≈ 1/100 = 1% (14)
where h∗ ≈ 3/4 and c∗ = 1/4, as described in the previous section. Because pC,sars is nine times larger than pH,sars
this imitates a correlation between the occurence of SARS and the health conditions of the person. In the algorithm
this is implemented by moving new members of the H and C classes with the probabilities pH,sars and pC,sars to the
SARS risk group. Members of this group will develop SARS after infection.
Another factor which plays an important role in the death statistics during epidemics is the fatality rate for SARS.
The rate depends on the age and the general health conditions of the patient, and on whether the patient is ventilated
or not when SARS develops. In the model we distinguish four situations, labeled by C0, C1, H0, and H1:
• C0: Patients with SARS from the C class who are not ventilated
• C1: Patients with SARS from the C class who are ventilated
• H0: Patients with SARS from the H class who are not ventilated
• H1: Patients with SARS from the H class who are ventilated
and we set probabilities of dying of SARS to 1.0, 0.3, 0.9, 0.1 for the C0,C1,H0 and H1 groups, respectively. In the
simulations we use daily SARS mortality rates, which are related to the probabilities of dying in the whole period by
an equation identical to Eq. (5) in which 〈pt〉 is interpreted as the probability of dying of SARS during the whole
period and p is the probability of dying within one day. Assuming that τ = 10, the corresponding daily rates are 1.0,
0.041, 0.474, 0.011 for the C0, C1, H0, H1 compartments, respectively. This choice of parameters corresponds to the
assumption that respiratory ventilation increases the probability of staying alive from 0% to 70% for people with SARS
in the C class, and from 10% to 90% for people with SARS in the H class. During epidemic the number of people with
SARS may easily exceed the number of ventilators available. We assume that there are V = 270 ventilators (intensive
care beds) per million inhabitants as in some European countries. A patient with SARS occupies a ventilator until
he or she dies or recovers. This takes takes ten days on average. So one can expect that if there are more than 27
new SARS cases per day, the demand for ventilators will exceed the health care capacity.
The ventilator availability is simulated as follows. At any moment of time we keep track of the number of available
ventilators. If this number is larger than zero, and there is a new SARS case, the number is decreased by one, and
the SARS patient is moved from the C0 to C1 or H0 to H1 compartment, respectively. The ventilator is occupied
until the patient recovers or dies, in which case the number of available ventilators is increased by one. Initially, the
number of ventilators is set to 270 per million.
Another factor which has to be taken into account in assessing the epidemic total death toll is a lower efficiency
of the healthcare system during epidemic. This has an impact on the increase of deaths of other causes which are
not directly related to SARS. The effect is more pronounced in the group of people with chronic diseases who require
continuous medical assistance, but it is also seen in the group of healthy people because regular medical procedures
are slowed down due to epidemic precautions in hospitals. One would have to conduct systematic statistical surveys
to estimate this effect. Here we just assume that the number of deaths of other causes than those directly related
to SARS increases from 27 to 30 per million per day during epidemic - roughly by 10%. We implement this effect
by changing values of the parameters β and γ in the transfer matrix (11) from β = 36 · 10−6 and γ = 108 · 10−6 to
β = 40 · 10−6 and γ = 120 · 10−6, during epidemic.
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